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Foreword 
Regulations  or  standards  on  goods  can  impact  trade  in  two  ways.  They  can 
advance domestic social goals like public health by establishing minimum standards or 
prescribing safety requirements; but they can also act as hidden protectionist policies. 
The WTO Agreements on the Application of Sanitary (for protection of human and 
animal health) and Phytosanitary (for protection of plant health) Measures (SPS) and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) try to strike a balance between these 
competing uses of standards in international trade. 
 
The SPS and TBT agreements acknowledge that governments have the right to 
take necessary measures for the protection of human, animal and plant health and allow 
some freedom for setting national standards to the extent required to protect them. But 
they  do  not  permit  Member  Governments  to  discriminate  by  applying  different 
requirements to different countries where the same or similar conditions prevail, unless 
there is sufficient scientific justification for doing so. These agreements also encourage 
countries to adopt international standards as a move towards global harmonization of 
product standards.  
 
There  is  growing  discontent  among  WTO  members,  particularly  among 
developing countries, that developing and least-developed countries so far have played a 
very minor role in setting international standards and taking advantage of that, stringent 
standards  have  been  set  which  sometimes  are  beyond  the  technical  competence  of 
developing  countries.  A  number  of  developing  countries,  including  India,  have 
suggested  that  developed  countries  are  using  the  SPS  and  TBT  measures  for 
protectionist purposes by prescribing overly stringent trade restrictive standards.  
 
The author argues that standards are public goods  and a greater premium  is 
placed on public goods like standards at a higher level of development. At present level 
of development, many developing countries, including India, are not ready to accept the 
costs of externally imposed standards. He is of the opinion that the cause of standards 
will be  better served by  removing  market access barriers and thus  boosting income 
growth in developing countries. Ensuring standards through trade policy, in his opinion, 
is a second best option. However, the author also thinks that like SPS/TBT standards 
can act as an external stimulus to improve domestic standards in India. 
 





Director & Chief Executive 
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June 2005  
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1  Introduction 
The  WTO  has  a  disseminating  document  titled  Understanding  the  WTO 
(WTO (2004a)).  The section on standards and safety in this document states, “Article 
20 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows governments to act 
on trade in order to protect human, animal or plant life or health, provided they do not 
discriminate or use this as disguised protectionism.  In addition, there are two specific 
WTO agreements dealing with food safety and animal and plant health and safety, and 
with  product  standards.”    The  reference  is  to  the  1947  GATT  agreement,  now 
subsumed  in  the  WTO  package.    More  specifically,  Article  XX  is  a  general 
exceptions clause and states, “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied  in  a manner  which  would  constitute a means  of  arbitrary  or  unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction  on  international  trade,  nothing  in  this  Agreement  shall  be construed  to 
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures…”   XX(b) 
mentions measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”, the 
purview  of  SPS  and  TBT.  XX(g)  mentions  “relating  to  the  conservation  of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions  on  domestic  production  or  consumption”  and  this  is  linked  to  the 
environment.   
 
One should remember that GATT functions on the basis of the most favoured 
nation  (MFN)  clause  or  non-discrimination  (enshrined  in  Article  I)  and  national 
treatment (enshrined in Article III).  These principles should also have applied to 
standards.  However, the insertion of Article XX(b) as a general exceptions clause 
meant that these principles could be violated for standards designed to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.  For instance, higher standards could be imposed on 
imported products than on domestic ones.  But this point should not be driven too 
hard.  The chapeau (introductory clause) of Article XX (quoted above) requires that 
GATT-inconsistent measures should not amount to disguised restrictions on trade and 
that they do not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.  These principles 
have  been  followed  in  GATT  and  WTO  jurisprudence  and  have  thus  restricted  
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GATT-inconsistency.  Not only must environmental measures be under the purview 
of Article XX(b) or XX(g), they must also satisfy what is called the necessity test
1. 
 
When  criticizing  the  SPS  or  TBT  agreements,  a  general  point  should  be 
remembered.  Protectionist  pressures  exist  in  every  country.    The  obvious  form 
protectionism takes is through tariffs.  If tariffs on industrial products are disciplined 
through multilateral commitments, as they have been in various GATT rounds since 
1947, and tariffs on agricultural products are also subject to disciplines, as they have 
been since the Uruguay Round (1986-94), protectionism will surface through other 
means.  With price-based measures or tariffs disciplined, policy substitution will lead 
to increased use of non-price based measures or non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
2.  These 
may be anti-dumping or anti-subsidy investigations, safeguards and even standards.  
With industrial tariffs dropping, that’s precisely the reason the Tokyo Round (1973-
79) shifted emphasis to NTBs.  An obvious point needs to be made.  In confronting 
such NTBs, is it better to have multilateral agreements or is it better to function in the 
absence of such agreements?  NTBs will still be used, but they will not be subject to 
multilateral disciplines.  Unilateral recourse to such measures can at best be sorted out 
through  bilateral  negotiations.    From  the  perspective  of  developing  countries  like 
India,  transaction  costs  in  negotiating  bilateral  deals  are  high,  apart  from  lack  of 
adequate countervailing power.  Hence, the preference ought to be for multilateral 
agreements. 
 
Tokyo  Round  agreements  on  assorted  NTBs  weren’t  multilateral.    They 
belonged  to  the  GATT-plus  or  plurilateral  system,  that  is,  they  were  open  for 
signature to countries that wished to do so and were not binding on non-signatories, 
even if non-signatories were members of GATT.  The 1979 Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT), also known as the Standards Code, belongs to this category 
and entered into force in January 1980.  India was a signatory to this 1979 version of 
                                                 
1   The necessity test has itself evolved over time, from what may be called a least-trade restrictive 
approach to a less-trade restrictive one.  There is also a proportionality test, about whether a series 
of factors have been properly weighed and balanced.  Criteria have also evolved to check disguised 
restrictions on international trade. 
2   In  this  paper  we  do  not  draw  a  distinction  between  non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  and  non-tariff 
measures (NTMs).  
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the TBT.  This is the right place to mention sanitary (for protecting human and animal 
health) and phytosanitary (for protecting plant health) measures, collectively referred 
to as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures.  The 1979 TBT code didn’t cover 
SPS issues, although technical requirements from SPS and inspection and labeling 
requirements were covered.   Some of  the principles of  the present  SPS and TBT 
agreements  can  be  tracked  back  to  this  1979  code  -  first,  the  principle  of 
harmonization and adherence to international standards, where possible; second, the 
transparency  provision  of  notifying,  through  GATT,  standards  that  deviated  from 
international standards; and third, some kind of dispute resolution mechanism. 
 
There were too reasons for dissatisfaction with the 1979 TBT code.  First, it 
was a plurilateral agreement and wasn’t therefore binding on all GATT members.
3  
Second, it didn’t cover SPS measures and these became important when agricultural 
liberalization was brought into the GATT fold during the Uruguay Round (1986-94).  
The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, which launched the Uruguay Round in 
1986, had an explicit objective of “minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations and barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking into 
account  the  relevant  international  agreements”.    In  the  course  of  the  actual 
negotiations, other than harmonization, transparency and dispute resolution, there was 
also the issue of scientific criteria used to evolve standards, for both SPS and TBT.  
And the question of special treatment to developing countries.  Finally, as part of the 
Uruguay  Round  package,  the  SPS  and  TBT  agreements  entered  into  force  on  1
st 
January  1995,  as  multilateral  agreements.    As  with  every  other  agreement  in  the 
Uruguay  Round  package,  the  present  SPS  and  TBT  agreements  represent  a 
compromise across diverse interests.  Ipso facto, every WTO member has reason for 
dissatisfaction, and that is a trait common to any compromise document. 
 
2  The SPS and TBT Agreements 
The  first  step  is  to  understand  what  is  a  SPS  measure  and  what  is  a  TB 
(technical barrier).  Annex 1 of the TBT agreement tells us that TBs can be technical 
regulations, standards or conformity assessment procedures.  A technical regulation is 
                                                 
3   However, some plurilateral agreements continue even now.  
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a “document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which 
compliance is mandatory.  It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, 
process or production method”.  A standard is a “document approved by a recognized 
body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics 
for products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is 
not mandatory.  It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production  method”.    Although  international  usage  sometimes  differs,  a  technical 
regulation  is  therefore  mandatory,  while  a  standard  is  voluntary.    Finally,  a 
conformity assessment procedure is “any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to 
determine  that  relevant  requirements  in  technical  regulations  or  standards  are 
fulfilled”. 
 
The point to note is that agricultural products can also be subject to the TBT 
agreement.  So can some elements of human, animal or plant health, such as labeling 
or packaging.  However, SPS measures defined in Annex A of the SPS agreement are 
outside  the  purview  of  TBT.    This  definition  lists,  “Any  measure  applied:  (a)  to 
protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms or disease-causing organisms; (b) to protect human or animal life or health 
within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, 
toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;  (c) to protect 
human  life or health within the territory of the   Member  from  risks arising  from 
diseases  carried  by  animals,  plants  or  products  thereof,  or  from  the  entry, 
establishment or spread of pests;  or (d) to prevent or limit other damage within the 
territory of the  Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.”  Hence, 
there is a difference in focus across the SPS and TBT agreements.  The intention 
behind the measure is the determinant of a SPS measure, whereas the type of measure 
is  the  determinant  of  a  TB  measure.    Also,  general  measures  for  protecting  the 
environment, consumer interests or animal welfare are outside the purview of the SPS 
agreement, except to the extent that they are covered in the quote above.  Indeed, part  
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of the problem with environmental issues and consequent unilateral measures is that 
there is no WTO agreement on environmental measures, apart from Article XX of 
GATT mentioned above.  This is not very different from SPS issues before 1995 or 
TBT issues before 1979.
4 
 
The TBT agreement is simpler.  It has 15 Articles and 3 Annexes, apart from a 
Preamble.  The more important Articles are now highlighted.  Article 1 has general 
provisions  and  through  Annex  1,  defines  technical  regulations,  standards  and 
conformity assessment procedures.  What is noteworthy is that unlike the 1979 Code, 
technical  regulations  now  include  process  and  production  methods  (PPMs),  in 
addition to products, provided these methods affect characteristics of the product, that 
is, provided they are incorporated or product-related PPMs.  Article 2.1 states the 
MFN  and  national  treatment  principles  and  this  should  be  borne  in  mind  when 
reacting to Article 2.3 of the SPS agreement, which permits such deviations.  Article 
2.2  accepts  environmental  protection  as  a  legitimate  objective  for  imposition  of 
technical regulations.  Article 2.4 requires adherence to international standards, but 
also  permits  deviations.    “Where  technical  regulations  are  required  and  relevant 
international  standards  exist  or  their  completion  is  imminent,  Members  shall  use 
them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except 
when  such  international  standards  or  relevant  parts  would  be  an  ineffective  or 
inappropriate  means  for  the  fulfillment  of  the  legitimate  objectives  pursued,  for 
instance  because  of  fundamental  climatic  or  geographical  factors  or  fundamental 
technological problems.”  Article 2.7 states that equivalent technical regulations of 
other  countries  must  be  accepted,  even  if  those  are  different.    The  problem  with 
implementing  this,  is  in  deciding  what  is  a  “like  product”.    And  when  adopted 
technical regulations differ from international standards, Article 2.9 has a system of 
notification.  Through Annex 3, Article 4 requires government standardizing bodies to 
comply with a Code of Good Practice.  Article 11 provides for technical assistance to 
developing countries, while Article 12 provides for special and differential treatment 
for  developing  countries.    There  is  indeed  some  ambiguity  in  the  present  TBT 
agreement, for instance in areas of non-product-related or unincorporated PPMs or 
                                                 
4   The Doha Ministerial Declaration and the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) are restricted to 
compatibility between existing WTO rules and multilateral environmental agreements.   
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non-mandatory  standards,  as  opposed  to  mandatory  technical  regulations.    It  is 
unreasonable to expect that a legal agreement will never have ambiguity or shades of 
grey.  Had that been the case, there would have been no disputes and no case law.  
However,  there  haven’t  been  too  many  dispute  resolution  cases  under  the  TBT 
agreement.  There are just four.
5 
 
Other than the Preamble, the SPS agreement has 14 Articles and 3 Annexes.  It 
is necessary to highlight and quote some of the more important Articles.  Article 2.2 
states, “Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based 
on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, 
except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.”  And in Article 2.3 we have, 
“Members  shall  ensure  that  their  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures  do  not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar 
conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members. 
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.”  This thus is a sanctioned 
deviation from the MFN and national treatment principles.  However, the quote also 
makes  it  clear  that  this  cannot  be  uncontrolled  deviation  from  MFN  and  national 
treatment.  Article 3 requires harmonization and Article 3.2 mentions adherence to 
international  standards.    However,  there  is  also  a  sanctioned  deviation  from 
international  standards  in  Article  3.3,  provided  there  is  scientific  justification.  
“Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result 
in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by 
measures  based  on  the  relevant  international  standards,  guidelines  or 
recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level 
of  sanitary  or  phytosanitary  protection  a  Member  determines  to  be  appropriate  in 
accordance  with  the  relevant  provisions  of  paragraphs  1  through  8  of  Article 5. 
Notwithstanding  the  above,  all  measures  which  result  in  a  level  of  sanitary  or 
phytosanitary protection different from that which would be achieved by measures 
                                                 
5    None of these involve India.  These cases are US (gasoline), Argentina (textiles and apparel), EC 
(hormones) and EC (asbestos).  In all four, various clauses of Article 2 of the TBT agreement was 
invoked.   
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based  on  international  standards,  guidelines  or  recommendations  shall  not  be 
inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement.”  In cases of deviation from 
international standards, there is a notification system.  Article 4 requires acceptance of 
equivalent standards  used in other  countries, subject  to  the TBT kind of  problem 
about identifying an identical or like product.  Article 5 requires risk assessment and 
choice of an appropriate level of SPS measures.  Article 5.7 deserves to be flagged, 
because  it  incorporates  the  precautionary  principle.    “In  cases  where  relevant 
scientific  evidence  is  insufficient,  a  Member  may  provisionally  adopt  sanitary  or 
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that 
from the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to 
obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk 
and review  the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable 
period of time.”  Article 9 has technical assistance for developing countries, while 
Article 10 has provisions on special and differential treatment. 
 
Like  the  TBT  agreement,  there  have  been  four  cases  involving  the  SPS 
agreement and none of these involve India.
6  The case law under the SPS agreement is 
however more important than the case law under the TBT agreement. For instance, 
there is the precautionary principle and the WTO is yet to take a position on the 
precautionary principle
7.  There are also grey areas in risk assessment, as distinct from 
risk management.  Rather interestingly, most panels seem to have ruled in favour of 
the complainant. 4140 SPS notifications have been submitted since 1995, 137 WTO 
member  countries  have  established  and  identified  enquiry  points  to  respond  to 
requests and 111 have identified national notification authorities.
8 
 
                                                 
6   These four cases are Australia (salmon), EC (hormones), Japan (fire blight) and Japan (varietals) 
and invoke Articles 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8 of the SPS agreement.  These are instances where panel and 
appellate body reports have been issued.  In addition, dispute settlement panels have been set up 
for  EC  (biotech  products),  Australia  (fresh  fruits  and  vegetables)  and  Australia  (quarantine 
regime).  See, WTO (2004b), Annual Report.    However, when the EC imposed import duties on 
rice, India asked for consultations and this also involved the SPS and TBT agreements. 
7   One can argue that the ruling in the Japan (varietals) case is not quite the same as in the EC 
(hormones) case. 
8   WTO (2004b).  
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3  The official Indian point of view 
Commerce Ministry brings out a monthly
9 publication known as India and the 
WTO.  This enables us to form an opinion about India’s negotiating position on the 
SPS and TBT agreements.  In bulleted form, the points are the following. 
 
(1) Developing  countries  like  India  have  a  marginal  role  in  international 
standard setting bodies. 
(2) “The criteria adopted for determining an international standard is rather 
general and broad-based. All standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed by an international standardizing body or system are required to 
be treated as an international standard and a standardizing body has been 
simply defined to be international if its membership is open to "at least all 
Members of WTO". It is therefore clear that in the absence of a precise 
definition  of  an  international  standard,  a  standard  adopted  by  the 
standardizing bodies is deemed to be an "international standard", even if 
only a limited number of countries may have participated in the technical 
work on developing the standard, and even if it may have been adopted, 
not by consensus, but by a slender majority vote.”
10 
(3) There  is  no  uniformity  in  standard  formulation  processes  followed  by 
different international bodies, or even in decision-making systems used to 
arrive at standards.  Standardization has been subject to politicization. 
(4) Regional standards should be considered in setting international standards. 
(5) Article 2, in Annex B of the SPS agreement states, “Members shall allow a 
reasonable interval between the publication of a sanitary or phytosanitary 
regulation and its entry into force in order to allow time for producers in 
exporting Members, and particularly in developing country Members, to 
adapt their products and methods of production to the requirements of the 
importing  Member.”    The  time-frame  is  not  specified  and  different 
                                                 
9   There are of course months when the publication has not appeared.  In other instances, issues have 
been combined. 
10   Paper submitted by India in the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, 
quoted in India and the WTO, July 1999.  
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developed countries use different time-frames.  Not enough time is given 
for  reacting  to  notifications  and  often  notifications  lack  specific 
information,  such  as  on  standards  or  risk  assessment  methodologies.  
Article 10.1 of the SPS agreement can be made mandatory. 
(6) Article 12 of the TBT agreement and Article 10 of the SPS agreement are 
not implemented properly.
11  For instance, developing country exporters 
are not granted enough time to adjust to new standards.  Article 10.2 of the 
SPS agreement can be made mandatory. 
(7) Standards are beyond the technical competence of developing countries 
and there is no technology transfer at “fair and reasonable cost”. 
(8) Developed country importers should accept self-declaration by developing 
country exporters.   
(9) There should be mutual recognition agreements between national standard 
setting  bodies  and  equivalence  of  standards  needs  to  be  established.  
Mutual recognition agreements should have a rules of origin clause. 
(10)  Standards lead to market access barriers. 
  
4  The market access issue 
In principle, standards can be interpreted as public goods.  They lead to costs, 
both direct and variable.  And they also lead to benefits, mandated standards being 
required  because  there  are  market  failures.    As  such,  the  welfare  implications  of 
standards are impossible to establish a priori.  There is some empirical literature on 
trade effects of TBs and SPS measures.
12  However, some of this trade literature is on 
what better domestic standards do to a country’s own trade flows and sometimes, this 
effect is positive, such as for exports from the home country.  A separate issue is 
whether standards imposed by a home country constrain its imports and thus act as 
NTBs on exports from other countries.  An oft-cited example is the EU regulation that 
dairy products come from milk from cows on farms and from cows that are milked 
mechanically.  Not only does this restrict imports from small producers in developing 
countries,  this  regulation  was  used  to  stop  imports  of  Mauritanian  camel  cheese.  
                                                 
11   Both are on special and differential treatment for developing countries. 
12   See the review in Wilson (2002).  
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Maskus and Wilson (2001) found that standards
13 resulted in equivalent tariffs far 
higher than announced tariff rates. 
 
Based on case studies undertaken by various authors
14, the following is an 
illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of items where standards are perceived to have 
acted as NTBs on India’s exports.  Because of domestic supply-side problems, India’s 
exports of agricultural products are lower than what they should be.  Had that not 
been the case, the number of SPS instances might have been higher still. 
 
Alfatoxin  in  peanuts  –  In  1999,  the  EC  imposed  new  tolerance  limits  for 
alfatoxin contamination in peanuts that were higher than those specified by Codex 
Alimentarius.  And a new testing procedure was announced. 
 
There is an EU requirement that records must be kept for each delivery of 
mangoes by farmers to pulp processors.  Not only does this increase transaction costs, 
it gets into broader issues of product standards versus process standards
15. 
 
(1) A similar issue arises for EU standards for milk and milk products, already 
mentioned.  In addition to standards, norms are stipulated for animal care and 
types  of  feed,  the  minimum  daily  yields  of  cows  and  buffaloes  are  also 
stipulated.  And these are higher than those laid down by the International 
Animal Health Code (IAHC) of the Office International des Epizootic (OIE). 
(2) Tea exports to Germany have confronted complaints about pesticide residues 
and these complaints seem to be somewhat arbitrary. 
(3) In 1997, the EC banned fishery imports from India on grounds o deficient 
infrastructure  and  lack  of  hygiene,  high  risks  for  public  health  and 
                                                 
13   This study was restricted to TBs.  
14   Wilson (2002) and Khan and Saqib (2005) are two examples. 
15   A hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) system is an example.  
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contamination  by  micro-organisms.    The  EC  standards  are  higher  than 
HACCP ones
16. 
(4) Egg-product exports to Japan confronted the problem of excessive BHC beta 
isomer  levels,  as  reported  by  a  testing  laboratory  in  Japan,  although 
laboratories in Bangalore and Belgium found that BHC levels were below the 
detectable limit. 
(5) Egg powder exports to Europe have confronted a March 2003 EC directive on 
Maximum  Required  Performance  Limit  (MRPL),  due  to  detection  of 
nitrofuran metabolites. 
(6) In both Brazil and Mexico, tire imports  require certification  in accordance 
with national standards.  The certification process is costly and thus excludes 
small exporters.
17 
(7) For steel exports, Australia and New Zealand require treated wood or wood 
substitutes and fumigation of containers
18. 
(8) Packaging and marking requirements, including language stipulations, lead to 
increased costs in European markets, across a variety of products. 
(9) The  US  Bio-Terrorism  Preparedness  and  Response  Act,  2002,  requires 
registration with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), maintenance of 
unnecessary records and prior notice of exports to the United States, the latter 
including a container security initiative. 
 
One should not jump to the conclusion that India is always at the receiving end 
when  standards  act  as  NTBs.    Indeed,  with  tariffs  dropping  and  quantitative 
restrictions  (QRs)  on  imports  eased,  India  has  often  used  quality  and  testing 
requirements on imported products.  Examples are labeling requirements on jute bags, 
registration  procedures  for  pharmaceuticals,  chemical  tests  for  leather  products, 
quarantine requirements for jute, certification and testing for cement and batteries and 
assorted  SPS  measures  for  agro  and  processed  food  products.    These  are  often 
                                                 
16   The ban followed an  original deadline  of 31
st  December 1996 for adherence to EU’s hygiene 
standards.  Perhaps one should also mention the Kenyan and Tanzanian examples of complying 
with EU’s food safety requirements. 
17   The Brazilian certificate is valid for one year and costs 20,000 US dollars.  The Mexican certificate 
costs between 40,000 and 50,000 US dollars for each type of tire. 
18   Fumigation costs 400 US dollars per container.  
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directed, not at imports from developed countries, but at imports from developing 
countries, China, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka being examples.  And some of India’s 
FTAs (free trade agreements) do explicitly mention such standards-related NTBs. 
 
5  The policy response 
The policy response has two angles, an external one and an internal one.  On 
the external response, one goes back to the issue of standards having costs, as well as 
benefits.    Arguably,  the  trade-off  between  the  two  is  a  function  of  the  level  of 
development.  At higher levels of development, measured by indicators like per capita 
income, there is a greater premium placed on public goods like standards.  Given that 
higher global standards are global public goods, the cause of providing these global 
public goods may be better served by removing market access barriers in developed 
countries  and  thus  boosting  income  growth  in  developing  countries  like  India.  
Ensuring standards through trade policy may well be a second-best option.  Stated 
differently,  externally  imposed  standards,  whether  sanctioned  by  multilateral 
agreements like SPS or TBT or not, imposes trade-offs that developing countries are 
not ready for.  The costs are perceived to be too high and the benefits too low.  In 
terms of negotiating, one thus negotiates along the lines indicated in Section 3, by 
emphasizing transparency, lack of discretion and arbitrariness in determination and 
administration  of  standards  and  special  and  differential  treatment  in  favour  of 
developing countries.  As an issue, revamping the dispute resolution mechanism is no 
less important, since developing countries often face large legal costs. 
 
However,  the  internal  policy  response  is  no  less  important  and  there  are 
several layers to this.  First, India has too many small exporters.  This is partly a 
historical legacy of policy regimes where export incentives were linked to physically 
exporting and partly a continuation of small-scale sector reservations.  In general, 
most of the 300,000 exporters find it difficult to bear marketing costs and specifically, 
find  it  difficult  to  bear  compliance  costs  associated  with  standards.
19    Second, 
                                                 
19   There is no need to presume that the small-scale sector will wither away in the face of competition.  
In production, where there are often diseconomies of scale, the small-scale sector will continue to 
exist. All that is being said is that there are economies of scale in marketing.  Nor is one suggesting 
that there should be a quota on the number of exporters.  Market-forces and competition will 
automatically lead to a shake-out.  
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compliance  costs  have  fixed  and  variable  cost  elements.    In  passing,  one  should 
mention  the  issue  of  government  subsidization  of  these  costs.    Because  of  fiscal 
constraints at both Central and State government levels, fiscal support is impossible.  
At  best,  one  can  expect  some  government-funded  infrastructure  and  information 
dissemination.  If fixed costs have to be recovered from export markets alone, even if 
the costs are affordable, Indian exports are liable to be rendered price uncompetitive.  
One should not forget that most Indian exports are in low-value segments with little 
product  differentiation  and  non-price-based  competition  and  are  therefore  price 
elastic.  It is thus desirable that fixed costs are also spread over domestic markets and 
this leads to the third point.  Segmentation of domestic and export markets is no 
longer possible.  One cannot cater to higher standards for export markets and lower 
standards for domestic markets.  Yet, domestic standards are often non-existent and 
this is more of a problem for SPS than for TBT.  Marine products are an example.  
There are no domestic standards for fish products
20.  Fourth, extrapolating the legal 
argument, it is not only the case that standards are non-existent, sometimes, there is a 
multiplicity of standards under different statutes and orders.  Hence, there is a need 
for rationalization, harmonization and unification and announcing standards where 
they are missing today.  Fifth, statutory announcement of standards is meaningless 
unless these are enforced.  This gets into broader issues of governance and the present 
Indian pathology of over-legislation and under-governance.  Perhaps one should also 
mention  the  product  liability  legislation  in  this  context,  there  being  a  case  for 
tightening it up and making it more stringent.  Sixth, there are problems with testing 
and  certification,  there  being  capacity-constraints  in  both.    Many  consumer 
organizations  now  have  research  wings  that  routinely  undertake  product  testing.
21  
This illustrates that there is scope for outsourcing both testing and certification to the 
private sector, subject to certain regulatory norms.  As a byproduct, this also ought to 
reduce avenues for corruption and rent-seeking.  Seventh, particularly in the context 
of SPS measures, there is a broader issue of agricultural reforms and changing the 
nature of the domestic food processing sector.  Refrigeration, cold storage facilities, 
transportation and post-harvest infrastructure are non-existent.  Standards are easier to 
                                                 
20   Some standards are issued through orders under the Essential Commodities Act of 1955 and fish 
products are conspicuous by their absence. 
21   Consumer Education and Research Centre and Voice are two examples.  
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enforce when there is a transition, consequent to income growth, from consuming 
fruits and vegetables in processed rather than in fresh form.  NSS (National Sample 
Survey) data from 1993-94 to 1999-2000 show that this has already begun to happen 
in India.  However, this transition needs to be facilitated through relaxation of entry 
barriers against private sector entry into food processing.
22  And finally, through BIS 
(Bureau  of  Indian  Standards),  there  is  a  need  for  information  dissemination  to 
producers about standards, both of the SPS and TBT varieties. 
 
Most reactions to SPS and TB standards imposed by developed countries tend 
to be negative, the argument being that at present levels of development, India isn’t 
ready for such standards.  However, an analogy probably exists in the way Indian 
attitudes have changed towards the TRIPs (trade-related intellectual property rights) 
and services agreement of the Uruguay Round.  In both instances, particularly in the 
former, there were serious internal systemic problems and one could have argued that 
India  wasn’t  ready  for  these  agreements  either,  as  was  indeed  argued  when  the 
Uruguay Round’s agenda was set.  But thanks to the external trigger, the changes 
have begun to happen.  This moral ought to extend to the SPS and TBT agreements 
also.  In the last resort, reaction to any multilateral agreement is a function of the 
speed of domestic reforms.  Arguably, for manufactured products, domestic standards 
today are better than they were in 1991, when the present cycle of reforms started.  
Thus, TBs are relatively less of a problem.  Once the agro-sector reforms take hold, 
that ought to also happen for SPS measures. 
 
                                                 
22   This is not the place to list out the long agenda of reforms in the food processing sector.  
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